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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHOICE OF PROCEDURE IN
DIVERSITY CASES
Since its decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,1 the Supreme
Court has attempted unsuccessfully to formulate rational and con-
sistent principles governing the choice between state and federal
procedural rules in diversity cases. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 2 although
it hinted that conflicts between procedural as well as substantive rules
would present problems of choice of law, was generally interpreted to
require federal courts to apply state law on "substantive" matters, leav-
ing them free to follow federal rules and practices which regulated
"procedure."3 The aims of Erie were first to assure potential defendants
that they would not be subject to different (and possibly conflicting)
obligations depending on whether a potential plaintiff brought suit
in state court or (availing himself of diversity jurisdiction) in federal
court; and second, to give proper recognition to state authority and
support to state policy.4 Since lack of uniformity between federal and
state procedural rules would seem neither to confuse the primary
obligations of the state's citizens nor to thwart the "public policy of
1. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
2. 304 US. 64 (1938). See generally Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (19416); Keeffe et at.,
Weary Erie, 34 CoRNu.L L.Q. 494 (1949); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection,
48 IOwA L. iE-v. 248 (1963); Bonor, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40
TExAs L. REv. 509, 619 (1962); Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment,
60 MIcH. L. REV. 1031 (1962); WRiGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 187-218 (1963).
3. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. I (E.D. Ill. 1938); Cohen v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
134 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1943); Schram v. Holmes, 4 F.R.D. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1943);
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: 'Substance' and 'Procedure' after Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, 34 1. L. REy. 271 (1939); Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie De-
railment, 60 MIca. L. RDv. 1031, 1032 (1962); See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 US.
99 (1945). See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460, 465 (1965): "The broad command of
Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law."
4. The Court, in overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 US. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), implicitly adopted
the position of Holmes' well-known dissent in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co.
v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 US. 518, 536 (1928) that "a settled
line of state decisions ... [should be] conclusive to establish ... the public policy of
the State. . . . [The State Courts should be taken to declare what the State wills."
Justice Brandeis concurred in Holmes' dissent and later wrote the opinion in Erie. See
also Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 90, 105 (1965).
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the State," Erie seemed to permit federal courts to use federal proce-
dures in diversity litigation. But York shattered this widespread assump-
tion about Erie. York rejected the simple distinction between substance
and procedure and required federal courts to apply state rules whenever
they "significantly affect the result of a litigation."5' "The nub of the
policy that underlies Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," said the Court, "is
that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident
litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away
should not lead to a substantially different result." The Court in York
did not consider whether the application of laws furthers or hinders
governmental policy. Instead, the Court focused entirely on the
"uniformity" aspect of the Erie doctrine.
Since almost any procedural rule may "significantly affect the out-
come of a case," a literal application of the York test would always
require the application of state procedures in diversity cases and thereby
obliterate almost all distinction between state and federal courts. The
principle of strict conformity to state procedure was nonetheless rein-
forced by the Supreme Court in three subsequent cases decided in
1949. In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,7 plaintiff, a foreign corporation
doing business locally which had not designated an agent for service of
process, was barred from federal court because a state statute provided
that such corporations may not sue in state courts. A pre-Erie federal
common-law rule would have permitted the action.8 In the second case,
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,9 plaintiff's suit was dismissed
because he did not comply with a state requirement 0 that plaintiffs in
stockholders' derivative actions deposit with the court sufficient funds
to cover expenses and attorneys' fees. A Federal Rule authorized stock-
holders' actions in federal court, but did not require such a bond to
be posted." In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,' 2 the
Court applied the state's method of determining when the statute of
limitation was tolled, despite a seeming conflict with Federal Rule 3.10
5. 326 U.S. at 109.
6. Ibid.
7. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
8. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489, 500 (1912).
9. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
10. N.J. STATS. ANN. § 14:3-15 (1939).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
12. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
13. Ragan was widely interpreted to have applied a state statute in the face of an
applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, and was thought to extend to other federal
procedures. One commentator wrote that
[p]ractidng attorneys are unable to determine which of the Federal Rules will remain
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The Court rejected uniformity as its only concern in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Co-op.,14 and rediscovered the "policy" concerns
of the Erie doctrine. The issue before the Court was whether plaintiff
in a personal injury action brought in a South Carolina federal court
was entitled to trial by jury on a certain question of jurisdictional fact.
The highest court of the forum state had ruled previously that the
submission to the jury of such a fact was reversible error. Skimming
the state court precedents, the Supreme Court found that no reason had
ever been given for this ruling; no deliberate policy appeared to sup-
port the courts' resolution of the factual issue on their own.1" In this
personal injury case, the Court conceded, the outcome
would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity
is decided by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were "outcome" the
in full effect, and which might be rejected by the courts on the theory that they
conflict in a substantial way with some state law. Every important step in a federal
diversity case is taken today at a calculated risk.
Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-a Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L REV.
711, 712 (1950). Another despaired that Ragan "threatens to invalidate all the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Quigley, supra note 3, at 1046. Four authors complained that
the three 1949 cases together "spell the death of diversity litigation .... The only hope
for the future lies in the dissent of Justice Rutledge. Let us believe that he is right and
that his view will one day triumph." Keeffe et al., supra note 2, at 531. See also Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 430-33 (1958); Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases,
67 YAr. L.J. 187, 194-95 (1957); Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rv. 560, 563 (1961). But see 2 Moorna,
FEDnm AL PRAcncF 3.07, at 740 (1960) for the suggestion that the Advisory Committee
which drafted Rule 3 never intended that it should toll state statutes of limitations.
This interpretation of the Rule, and the corresponding interpretation of Ragan as a
case in which the federal and state rules did not conflict, was approved by the Supreme
Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 n.12 (1965), over the objection of Mr.
Justice Harlan, id. at 476-77.
The anguish expressed in the law reviews was probably unwarranted. The doctrine
was undoubtedly applied from time to time to the detriment of various Federal Rules.
Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105, 112-13 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (Rule 23b); Doyle v. Moylan,
CA-54-507-A (D. Mass. 1955), cited in Doyle v. Moylan, 141 F. Supp. 95, 96 (D. Mass.
1956) (Rule 4(d)(1)); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1955) (Rule 43a).
And it may have deterred reliance on the Rules in an unknown number of cases. But
at least some lower courts ignored Ragan or limited its holding to Rule 3. Guthrie v.
Great American Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1945); Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595, 602
(5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950); Moran v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co.,
183 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1950). See also Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection,
48 IowA L. REv. 248, 261-62 (1963) for the suggestion that the rule of York was dis-
regarded primarily in the areas of docket control, discovery (the lower courts relying on
the decision in Sibbach v. Wilson Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)), the court's power to comment
upon the evidence, and, to a lesser extent, rules of evidence.
14. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
15. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 543, 96 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1957).
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only consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the
federal court should follow the state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for admin-
istering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An
essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in
civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-
of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed
questions of fact to the jury.'0
Therefore, the Court held, the jury should decide the factual ques-
tion. In other words, at least when the state rule represents no policy,
a federal policy in favor of jury trials is a sufficient ground for the
application of the federal procedure-even though this application is
not constitutionally required,17 and even though uniformity of out-
come does not result.
The Court in Hanna v. Plumer'8 rejected this sensitive concern for
the implementation of state and federal policies in favor of a new
mechanical rule-this time, one which will select the federal procedural
rule in nearly all diversity cases. Plaintiff, in accordance with Federal
Rule 4,19 left copies of his summons with the wife of defendant executor
at his residence. The state statute prescribed that service of executors
shall be in hand.20 Relying on York, defendant contended that since
the federal court's determination of applicable procedure was out-
come-determinative, the state rule should be selected. The Supreme
Court held that the federal rule controlled, reasoning that Federal
Rules which have been promulgated according to the requirements of
the Rules Enabling Act and which are "within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure [in terms of the Erie doctrine] ... ra-
tionally capable of classification as either" should always be applied
in diversity cases.21 Implicit in the Court's holding was a total disregard
16. 356 U.S. at 537. (Emphasis added.) But see Walker v. United States Gypsum Co.,
270 F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1959) for the suggestion that even in a federal court, jurisdictional
issues of fact are never given to the jury. The Walker court questioned whether in Byrd
there was in fact a conflict between federal and state practices.
17. In a footnote to the Byrd opinion, the Court said, "Our conclusion makes un-
necessary the consideration of-and we intimate no view upon-the constitutional question
whether the right of jury trial protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment
embraces the factual issue of statutory immunity when asserted, as here, as an affirmative
defense in a common-law negligence action." 356 U.S. at 537 n.10.
18. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
20. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1955).
21. 380 U.S. at 472.
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for those state policies with which the Federal Rules might interfere,
as well as a lack of concern about federal-state uniformity.
A rational system for choosing between competing procedures in
diversity cases must be founded on an appreciation both of the reasons
for which uniformity is desirable and of the nature of the policies
represented by rules of procedure. Uniformity is most needed when in
its absence parties would be uncertain about their rights and duties,-
that is, about how to conduct their ordinary affairs. When a person
can only guess whether he might be sued in a federal or a state court,
he may be unjustly subjected to two conflicting obligations. In most
federal-state procedural conflicts, however, a lack of uniformity will at
most affect the litigants' choice of forum. If the federal courts use
procedures different from those of the local state, an out-of-state party
may gain some advantage by choosing the federal forum. But the
critical question is whether or not this advantage is unfair.
It is true, though not readily apparent, that there is no unfairness in
allowing procedural advantages to those plaintiffs fortunate enough not
to live in the same state as those whom they are suing. The case for
unfairness would seem strongest when a citizen of State A and a citizen
of State B sue another citizen of State B in separate actions arising out
of the same tort. Both states might have the same restrictive rules of
discovery which would prevent the plaintiffs from discovering the
evidence needed to win. The more lenient Federal Rules, on the other
hand, would enable a plaintiff to discover this evidence. Because the
citizen of State A can bring suit in federal court, he wins, while his
counterpart across the state line loses.
This distinction, far from being arbitrary, is a reasoned distinction
sanctioned by the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction. The
framers apparently felt it necessary to create an independent judicial
system in order to insure that the laws of each state were fairly applied
to residents of the other states. When a federal court acts in a diversity
case it acts as part of this independent system, and it has the responsi-
bility to administer fairly the laws of some state. This responsibility
may be met in various ways, for example, tenured judges, impartial
juries, etc. But certainly one way, indeed an essential way, to administer
law fairly is to provide proper rules of procedure. Thus, when an out-
of-state plaintiff shops for the procedures of a federal court he shops
not for unfair advantages but for neutral procedures under which he
may seek a fair disposition of his claim. If the federal courts deny him
this choice and defer to state court procedure they abdicate their
1966]
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constitutionally and congressionally imposed duty to choose for them-
selves rules which will treat fairly the litigants before them.
The very existence of diversity jurisdiction creates a strong presump-
tion that the federal rules of procedure should always apply. However,
another goal of diversity jurisdiction, the effectuation of local policy,
a goal made clear in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, might cause a state rule
of procedure to displace the federal rule when the application of the
federal rule instead of the state rule would frustrate state policy. A
state may, of course, claim that all of its procedural rules represent
policies, and that whenever a federal rule displaces one of these, state
policy is frustrated. Although all procedural rules may represent
policies it is necessary to distinguish the kinds of policies involved in
order to determine whether the state rule should or should not apply.
It is helpful to distinguish between two kinds of policies. We may
define a primary policy as an imputed desire of a sovereign to influence
the future behavior of those within its legal jurisdiction in order to
bring about a desired condition. A rule or law enacted to further a
primary policy is one which, if controlling, promotes the sovereign's
progress toward the state of affairs which the policy seeks to bring
about. Such a rule, if not held to control in a situation it ostensibly
governs, frustrates the sovereign's progress. For example, rules which
establish the negotiability of commercial paper tend to encourage com-
mercial transactions and therefore create a desired condition of free
commercial intercourse. If one of these rules is displaced by a rule
which removes negotiability from some paper, the future conduct of
businessmen will be affected in a way which thwarts the sovereign's
progress toward the desired condition. Rules which create criminal
liability for murder (and deter killing to bring about a peaceful
society), and rules which protect free speech (and encourage expression
to create a better informed, more peaceful community), are also rules
which represent primary policies. Rules of procedure may represent
primary policies, though much less often than substantive rules. For
example, the exclusion from evidence of a clergyman's testimony con-
cerning confidential communications from his parishioner serves the
policy of encouraging such communication. Failure to apply the
exclusionary rule would deter intercourse which the sovereign wishes
to encourage.
We may define a secondary policy as an imputed concern for the
just disposition of cases. Rules which represent a sovereign's deter-
mination of what constitutes fairness in a lawsuit may take many forms,
For example, most of what we call rules of procedure represent choices
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about the best way for a court to reach a fair result. But other rules,
normally thought of as substantive and which have nothing to do with
how a lawsuit should be run, may represent a sovereign's determination
of fairness between the litigants-for example, rules pertaining to
the doctrine of mutual mistake.
Secondary policies differ from primary policies in two ways: First,
rules which represent secondary policies do not attempt to influence
future behavior in the ordinary or business affairs of the community.
We do not mean to suggest that rules which represent secondary policies
never affect behavior, only that in adopting these rules the sovereign
has made a choice about fairness between the parties in a lawsuit,
not a choice about what the society should look like in the future.
Citizens in the community may let the doctrine of mutual mistake
affect their commercial transactions (how likely is this supposition?),
but the rules of mutual mistake were not designed to encourage one
kind of action and discourage others in order to bring about any
particular desired condition in the society. The second difference
follows from the first. When one sovereign's rule representing a
secondary policy is not applied by a court of a second sovereign the
first sovereign is not thwarted significantly. Since the first sovereign was
not attempting to affect the future behavior of its citizens in order to
create any particular condition, the second sovereign was not inter-
fering with the first's progress in any meaningful sense. Of course the
first sovereign might claim that its rules should protect (or restrain)
its citizens no matter in what court they are. But this claim would be
unjustified because the rules in question were not designed for that
purpose. It is of no concern to the first sovereign if the second sovereign
has a different view of the requisites of fairness and administers a
different kind of justice in its courts.
Since the application of the federal rule can never frustrate a state's
secondary policy, the federal rule should always be applied whenever
the state rule represents a secondary policy alone.2 Only a state's
22. It is possible that in a given case of conflicting rules, the state rule might represent
no policy, and in such a case it has no claim to applicability. This was true in Byrd.
where no reasonable purpose could either be imagined or discovered in the state precedents
to support the regulation. A more complex instance is presented by the case of lovino v.
Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub noti. Carlin v. lovino, 362 U.S.
949 (1960). Defendant died during a suit for personal injury. His out-of-state administra-
trix ad litem resisted suit on the grounds that the federal court, under the rule of Yorl:.
was bound by New York rules of revivor, New York law did not provide for substitution
of out-of-state administrators. The only reasonable policy that might be assigned to the
state decisional rule is the protection of estates from suit. But the fact that New York
permitted revivor against domestic administrators argues against the likelihood that New
1966]
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primary policies should be given any weight when federal and state
rules of procedure conflict. This conclusion implements both policies
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-effectuation of state policy and uniformity.
When a federal court applies a rule representing a state's primary policy
it is likely that the court furthers that policy and also discourages the
kind of disuniformity which makes primary rights and duties uncertain.
But, of course, the federal court should not apply the state rule, even
if the rule represents a primary policy, when in a particular case the
application would not further that policy or significantly reduce the
uncertainty of conflicting primary rights or duties.
Thus, in Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach,23 the president of the insured
corporation objected to the introduction into evidence of a statement
made by him prior to suit in a federal district court. His statement had
been made during a pre-trial investigation conducted pursuant to the
terms of an insurance policy. A Florida statute24 would have excluded
this statement since the insurance company did not furnish the presi-
dent with a copy as he had demanded. But since pre-1938 federal
equity practice would admit the statement, it was held admissible as
evidence under Federal Rule 43(a). The policy underlying the Florida
statute is more than fairness at trial; the policy is primary to the extent
that the rule sought free exchange of information between policyholders
and insurance companies by assuring the policyholder that his statements
could not be used against him at trial without his first seeing a copy of
the statement. But Florida had no legitimate interest in the application
of its rule in this particular case. In a federal court, unlike a Florida
state court, the company president could have used discovery proce-
dures to obtain a copy of his statement. Since the Florida rule was not
needed to secure a copy of the statement before trial, the policy sup-
porting that rule was not relevant.
If the state does have a legitimate interest, the federal court will have
to resolve the state and federal interests.2 When application of the state
York had adopted this policy. More important, this decisional rule did not represent
any deliberate state policy; the New York legislature had twice tried to permit substltu.
tion but the New York courts declared the legislation to require an unconstitutlonal
assertion of jurisdiction. McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925). By the
time of the lovino decision, the Supreme Court had expanded the constitutional doctrine
of state jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the light of this history, New York could not be said to have
any deliberate policy behind its rule of law.
28. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.33 (1959).
25. The resolution of conflicts of sovereign interests has been widely commented upon,
usually in connection with conflicting state substantive rules. See generally Cook, Tho
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rule would substantially undercut the federal system's notion of fair-
ness, but application of the federal rule interferes only minimally with
the state's primary policy, the federal rule should apply. -0 For instance,
in the Hanna7 case the state's primary policy was to facilitate the speedy
distribution of estates by permitting an executor to disburse the funds
if no party had served him personally by the time the statute of limi-
tations had run. The policies behind the more liberal federal rules of
service are to make it convenient to institute legal proceedings and to
avoid the defeat of justice by defendants who evade process. Application
of the state rule would defeat the federal policy in all cases in which
the defendant evaded the process-server. By contrast, the federal rule
would impair state policy only by requiring executors to inquire at
home whether process has been served. In his concurring opinion in
Hanna, Mr. Justice Harlan suggests a test for choice of procedure
which at first glance seems similar to this analysis. He asks "how
seriously [the federal procedure] frustrated the State's substantive regu-
lation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens."28 But Mr.
Justice Harlan's opinion is deficient in two respects. He does not make
explicit his definitions of "substantive" or "primary conduct and
affairs." More important, he is concerned only with relative impairment
of state policy, whereas the application of state rules in a federal court
may influence federal policies in differing degrees. Logically, the court
should consider the potential impairment of both federal and state
policies in choosing the procedure to apply.
For some pairs of conflicting rules, each rule will equally impair the
policy of the other in all cases, and it may be impossible to use the
above test. The federal court may then attempt to balance interests to
determine which policy to implement at the expense of the other. If,
for example, a federal rule of discovery conflicts with a state rule
regarding as privileged the communications between doctor and patient,
there would seem to be no easy resolution of the federal policy of fair-
ness and the state's primary policy of encouraging unrestricted com-
munication. Disregard for the state policy in this example would render
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YAm LJ. 457 (1924); Cavcrs, A Cri-
tique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HIAv. L. REv. 173 (1933); Cavers, The Two "Local
Law" Theories, 63 HAiV. L. REv. 822 (1950); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Traynor, Conflicts of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained
and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. Riv. 845 (1961); Hill, Governmental Interest and
the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Ritv. 463 (1960). CuiR.
SELErOD ESSAYS ON THE CONFUCT OF LAWS (1963).
26. Cf. :Baxter, supra n.25.
27. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
28. Id. at 476.
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uncertain and illusory the right of patients freely to communicate with
their doctors. In this case the federal court must respect Erie's concern
for effectuating local policy and preventing uncertainties caused by
forum-shopping by applying the state rule. This application will under-
cut the federal policy of fair procedure, but only by creating narrow
exceptions to broad discovery rules. 29
The method which we advocate for choosing between federal and
state procedural rules will most often result in the application of the
federal rule (since most state rules will represent secondary policies or
relatively unimportant primary policies). In this regard our conclusion
does not differ very much from the mechanical rule announced in
Hanna v. Plumer. However, the courts should provide reasons for the
application of one or the other rule which satisfy the policies of diversity
jurisdiction and of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. Mr. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Hanna comes closest to a satisfactory solution. In the
future, the Court should adopt his opinion and should elaborate the
distinctions between primary and secondary state policies, the condi-
tions under which a state's policy supports an interest in litigation
in a federal court, and the principles for the resolution of conflicts
between state and federal interests.
29. Similarly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), the federal rule
should have been applied because it would have interfered less with the state policy
than the state procedure interfered with the federal policy. Application of the state
rule required all foreign plaintiff corporations to designate an agent for purposes of
service of process. Even had the federal rule governed, many out of state corporations
would have designated such an agent, if only to be able to sue local defendants in
cases where the amount in controversy fell below the federal jurisdictional limit.
